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Books
The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce CP1-8

CP1 Principles of Philosophy
Harvard University Press 1931

Pi

Contents

Introduction

Preface

Book I. General Historical Orientation
Chapter 1. Lessons From the History of Philosophy
    1. Nominalism 15
    2. Conceptualism 27
    3. The Spirit of Scholasticism 28
    4. Kant and his Refutation of Idealism 35
    5. Hegelism 40
Chapter 2. Lessons From the History of Science
    1. The Scientific Attitude 43
    2. The Scientific Imagination 46
    3. Science and Morality 49
    4. Mathematics 52
    5. Science as a Guide to Conduct 55
    6. Morality and Sham Reasoning 56
    7. The Method of Authority 59
    8. Science and Continuity 61
    9. The Analytic Method 63
    10. Kinds of Reasoning 65
    11. The Study of the Useless 75
    12. Il Lume Naturale 80
    13. Generalization and Abstraction 82
    14. The Evaluation of Exactitude 85
    15. Science and Extraordinary Phenomena 87
    16. Reasoning from Samples 92
    17. The Method of Residual Phenomena 98
    18. Observation 99
    19. Evolution 103
    20. Some A Priori Dicta 110
    21. The Paucity of Scientific Knowledge 116
    22. The Uncertainty of Scientific Results 120
    23. Economy of Research 122
Chapter 3. Notes On Scientific Philosophy
    1. Laboratory and Seminary Philosophies 126
    2. Axioms 130
    3. The Observational Part of Philosophy 133
    4. The First Rule of Reason 135
    5. Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution 141
    

Book II. The Classification of The Sciences
Chapter 1. An Outline Classification of The Sciences
Chapter 2. A Detailed Classification of The Sciences
    1. Natural Classes 203
    2. Natural Classifications 224
    3. The Essence of Science 232
    4. The Divisions of Science 238
    5. The Divisions of Philosophy 273
    6. The Divisions of Mathematics 283
    

Book III. PHENOMENOLOGY
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
    1. The Phaneron 284
    2. Valencies 288
    3. Monads, Dyads, and Triads 293
    4. Indecomposable Elements 294
Chapter 2. THE CATEGORIES IN DETAIL
    A. Firstness
    1. The Source of the Categories 300
    2. The Manifestation of Firstness 302
    3. The Monad 303
    4. Qualities of Feeling 304
    5. Feeling as Independent of Mind and Change 305
    6. A Definition of Feeling 306
    7. The Similarity of Feelings of Different Sensory Modes 312
    8. Presentments as Signs 313
    9. The Communicability of Feelings 314
    10. The Transition to Secondness 317
    B. Secondness
    1. Feeling and Struggle 322
    2. Action and Perception 324
    3. The Varieties of Secondness 325
    4. The Dyad 326
    5. Polar Distinctions and Volition 330
    6. Ego and Non-Ego 332
    7. Shock and the Sense of Change 335
    C. Thirdness
    1. Examples of Thirdness 337
    2. Representation and Generality 338
    3. The Reality of Thirdness 343
    4. Protoplasm and the Categories 350
    5. The Interdependence of the Categories 353
Chapter 3. A GUESS AT THE RIDDLE
    Plan of the Work 354
    1. Trichotomy 355
    2. The Triad in Reasoning 369
    3. The Triad in Metaphysics 373
    4. The Triad in Psychology 374
    5. The Triad in Physiology 385
    6. The Triad in Biological Development 395
    7. The Triad in Physics 400
Chapter 4. THE LOGIC OF MATHEMATICS; AN ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP MY CATEGORIES FROM WITHIN
    1. The Three Categories 417
    2. Quality 422
    3. Fact 427
    4. Dyads 441
    5. Triads 471
Chapter 5. DEGENERATE CASES
    1. Kinds of Secondness 521
    2. The Firstness of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness 530
Chapter 6. ON A NEW LIST OF CATEGORIES
    1. Original Statement 545
    2. Notes on the Preceding 560
Chapter 7. TRIADOMANY 568
    

Book IV. THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 573
Chapter 2. ULTIMATE GOODS 575
Chapter 3. AN ATTEMPTED CLASSIFICATION OF ENDS 585
Chapter 4. IDEALS OF CONDUCT 591
Chapter 5. VITALLY IMPORTANT TOPICS
    1. Theory and Practice 616
    2. Practical Concerns and the Wisdom of Sentiment 649
    3. Vitally Important Truths 661

Books | The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (CP) 1-8 | CP1 Principles of Philosophy

Preface

Peirce Point-i
CP 1.5
The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to my thinking, the finest piece of philosophical work of the prescientific ages. Yet I can but pronounce English sensationalism to be entirely destitute of any solid bottom. Bottom is ground or foundation. It is the fundamentalism that things exist, that existence is not the word that motion is, but is actually integral and requires solid ground and foundation by which to also exist—produce, do and have itself.

Sensationalism is the destitution of sense. It is the error that man is not man, but human, hence sensationalism is such sense-or-nonsense as humans have, as if things are only thereby true or not, as the self-contradiction and denial that everything is man. It is the error that man is as subject-agent particularly prone to being ungrounded through error by honest ignorance and dishonesty about itself, others or other things including itself (I about me), and insanity.

The association of ideas is the riotously dissociative substitute for man, where man is the symbol (word) as the icon (image) that the index (noise) is. — Symbol, index and icon are symbol, so everything is symbol.

CP 1.13
Peircean [human] fallibilism is acknowledgement of one's own subjective ignorance and uncertainty about some integral reality and so, one's own failings within it. Everything is motion, which is point, time, word and man. Fallibilism is not redundant or irrelevant, but absolute error. It is the error to exist.

It is the Holy (abysmal) Mythology as the denial of man, as the error that man is not man, but human (subject to gods, spirits or universe), and that humans—pathetic next to Their Masters' Infallibility (whatever They are)—inevitably translates to error — which is exactly what the error is, that is the abyss.

Anyone supposedly as god is the infallible differential equation emergent in fallibility.

CP 1.14
Indeed, out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out, all my philosophy has always seemed to me to grow. . . Not only is Peirce impressed by his own fallibilism, such impression he says, is contrite, i.e., riddled with guilt... which is the reason that he is "devoured by a desire to find out" (CP1.8) what integral reality is, wherein his philosophy's 'growth'.

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