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Geoffrey Haselhurst re. 20200925.03

 "fluid’s parts"

That is the problem with a flowing space, it must have parts, and then you have the ongoing problem of how are the parts connected, what is between the parts, i.e. the same problem as particles, but on a lower level.

To be honest, it is a naive conception, it does not work, you end up inventing things to explain how everything is connected.

The solution is simple, just one thing exists, a continuous infinite eternal space that has waves flowing through it in all directions, forming standing waves, where certain standing wave patterns form matter, and all matter is connected by its in and out waves in a continuously connected space.

i.e.
We know the truth about things when we know how they are connected.

The empirical reader of this book could have the impression that its various chapters deal with two theoretical objects, mutually incompatible, each being focused on as the object of a general semiotic approach: the sign, or the sign-function, and semiosis. The sign is usually considered as a correlation between a signifier and a signified (or between expression and content) and therefore as an action between pairs. Semiosis is, according to Peirce, "an action, or influence, which is, or involves, an operation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into an action between pairs" (C. P. 5.484).

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Charles Sanders Peirce

Below a very relevant CP-quote also in the light of the linked video, that imaginary numbers are real.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T647CGsuOVU
Imaginary Numbers Are Real [Part 1: Introduction]

The new point is that everything is mathematical, as the point-space motion identity (point-i) that meaning or word is. Re. CP 5.484 below. Point-i is the theory or model that the triadic sign is universal. The point that everything is, is every 'concept' as inextricably voluminous or body, and the geometric structure is 3d, rather than three actually embodied subjects (persons or personified agents—as matter or to back it up spirit), thereby reacting equally on each other. Note also the hidden continuous wave by the universal medium's curvature; as 'imaginary' repetition at the end of the first paragraph of 5.483.

The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (CP), 2904pp.

From CP 5 (Book 5)

CP 5.481 – 5.484

481. In the next step of thought, those first logical interpretants stimulate us to various voluntary performances in the inner world. We imagine ourselves in various situations and animated by various motives; and we proceed to trace out the alternative lines of conduct which the conjectures would leave open to us. We are, moreover, led, by the same inward activity, to remark different ways in which our conjectures could be slightly modified. The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in a relatively future tense.

482. To this may be added the consideration that it is not all signs that have logical interpretants, but only intellectual concepts and the like; and these are all either general or intimately connected with generals, as it seems to me. This shows that the species of future tense of the logical interpretant is that of the conditional mood, the "would-be."

483. At the time I was originally puzzling over the enigma of the nature of the logical interpretant, and had reached about the stage where the discussion now is, being in a quandary, it occurred to me that if I only could find a moderate number of concepts which should be at once highly abstract and abstruse, and yet the whole nature of whose meanings should be quite unquestionable, a study of them would go far toward showing me how and why the logical interpretant should in all cases be a conditional future. I had no sooner framed a definite wish for such concepts, than I perceived that in mathematics they are as plenty as blackberries. I at once began running through the explications of them, which I found all took the following form: Proceed according to such and such a general rule. Then, if such and such a concept is applicable to such and such an object, the operation will have such and such a general result; and conversely. Thus, to take an extremely simple case, if two geometrical figures of dimensionality N should be equal in all their parts, an easy rule of construction would determine, in a space of dimensionality N containing both figures, an axis of rotation, such that a rigid body that should fill not only that space but also a space of dimensionality N + 1, containing the former space, turning about that axis, and carrying one of the figures along with it while the other figure remained at rest, the rotation would bring the movable figure back into its original space of dimensionality, N, and when that event occurred, the movable figure would be in exact coincidence with the unmoved one, in all its parts; while if the two figures were not so equal, this would never happen.

Here was certainly a stride toward the solution of the enigma.

For the treatment of a score of intellectual concepts on that model, only a few of them being mathematical, seemed to me to be so refulgently successful as fully to convince me that to predicate any such concept of a real or imaginary object is equivalent to declaring that a certain operation, corresponding to the concept, if performed upon that object, would (certainly, or probably, or possibly, according to the mode of predication), be followed by a result of a definite general description.

484. Yet this does not quite tell us just what the nature is of the essential effect upon the interpreter, brought about by the semiosis of the sign, which constitutes the logical interpretant. (It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place between two subjects [whether they react equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially] or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a coöperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. {Sémeiösis} in Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero's time, if I remember rightly, meant the action of almost any kind of sign; and my definition confers on anything that so acts the title of a "sign.")

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